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interviews conducted with VC entrepreneurs and executives who participate in EIR programs
in the ICT industry, primarily in the Dan Area in central Israel (considered to be that
countryâs equivalent of Silicon Valley). The findings indicated that EIR programs
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coefficient" the VCâs confidence in the entrepreneurâs intention and ability to deliver
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Introduction 
 
Venture Capital (VC) has proven to be one of the most capital efficient mechanisms for 
building new businesses and creating jobs in Israel’s information and communication technology 
(ICT) field (Myre, 2005). Since 1995, the Israeli economy has experienced an inflow of $43 
billion in ICT investments⎯$16 billion from VC investments, $20 billion from the ventures’ 
proceeds and $7 billion through VC-backed initial public offerings or IPOs (IVA 2005 
Yearbook).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Capital raised by Israeli seed companies 
 
During the first half of 2005, Israeli VCs invested 7 percent of their total available funds 
in ICT startup/seed ventures. In contrast, Silicon Valley VCs shunned startup/seed ventures and 
invested only 0.1 percent of total available funds during the same time frame (Table 1).  
Shunning startup/seed ventures is a phenomenon called equity gap. The equity gap arises 
from the perception that high transactional and monitoring costs associated with startup/seed 
ventures make them unattractive (uneconomic) for investment.  
Because VCs favor ventures in later stages of development that can demonstrate positive 
marketing and financial history, startup ventures with no previous performance history are 
disadvantaged (Table 1). In the United States, this financing gap exists for entrepreneurs seeking 
between $500,000 and $1,500,000 (Alvarez and others, 1997). Such an equity gap is also present 
in many other countries including the UK (Mason, 1996) and in Israel on a smaller scale. 
Israeli VC funds have always recognized the importance of a portfolio with a significant 
amount of startup/seed ventures (Figure 1 and Table 1) and, after the high-tech “bubble” burst in 
2001, have resumed investment in startup/seed programs. This new investment wave is 
influenced by Entrepreneur/Executive in Residency (EIR) programs and the Israeli government’s 
risk-reducing programs.  
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    Venture Capital Investment in start-up/seed ICT companies
             I S R A E L   YEAR        S I L I C O N  V A L L E Y
# deals $M USD % total # deals $M USD % total
69 $63 5.0% 1999 284 $1,341 7.0%
113 $300 10.0% 2000 186 $869 3.0%
61 $95 5.0% 2001 73 $196 1.0%
19 $23 2.0% 2002 37 $102 0.4%
37 $58 6.0% 2003 54 $139 0.7%
54 $108 8.0% 2004 37 $127 0.8%
27 $54 7.0% H1 2005 7 $9 0.1%
from IVC and Moneytree Surveys  
   
Table 1.Venture capital investment in start-up/seed ICT companies 
                                             
 
Research Overview
 This article examines how the equity gap obstacle can be cleared with EIR programs. 
Specifically, it discusses how factors such as trust and control combine to shape the perceived 
transaction and monitoring costs that comprise the equity gap, thus influencing a VC’s decision 
to invest in a startup ICT venture.  
 The research is based on qualitative interviews conducted with VC entrepreneurs and 
executives in the ICT industry who participate in EIR programs, primarily in the Dan Area in 
central Israel (that country’s equivalent of Silicon Valley). The qualitative analysis helps us to 
understand the connections between three constructs of control (behavior, output and social) and 
two constructs of trust (competence and goodwill) that contribute to the perceived transaction 
and monitoring costs that VCs consider before deciding to invest. 
 
Findings and Implications 
The findings indicate that by increasing various types of trust and control ⎯ and thus 
mitigating the perceived risks that comprise the equity gap ⎯ EIR programs raise what we call 
the “confidence coefficient,” or the VC’s confidence in the entrepreneur’s intention and ability to 
deliver the deal’s return on investment. This promotes the likelihood that the VC will fund the 
startup venture. 
 This study has implications for addressing a relatively new phenomenon: the tendency of 
VC firms in the United States and the European Union to concentrate on larger and larger deals 
and, as a result, fail to adequately fund early-stage ventures. If left unchecked, this could threaten 
to derail ICT entrepreneurism. The knowledge presented in this article can be used to help 
practitioners launch new EIR programs or improve existing programs, and to help academicians 
shape further research on the VC equity gap.   
 
 
Literature Review 
 
The field of entrepreneurship research is full of studies about the entrepreneur as the most 
important player in new venture creation. The contemporary view is that entrepreneurs are driven 
by motivational forces outside the strict orientation of market capitalism (McDaniel 2005). 
Entrepreneurs are not the risk bearers (Schumpeter, 1934); their function is to innovate (Acs. et. 
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al. 2005). Entrepreneurs are driven by pecuniary profits (payment for efforts) and not capitalistic 
profit motivation (McDaniel 2005). Risk bearing is the function of the capitalist who lends his 
money to the entrepreneur (Schumpeter, 1934; Acs. et. al. 2005). Access to equity capital, not 
credit, is the major financial obstacle for the entrepreneur (Van Osnabrugge & Robinson, 2000). 
Entrepreneurial firms, especially those in the startup/seed stage, need high-risk, patient, value-
added equity financing. In other words, they need venture capital (VC).   
The idea that talented entrepreneurs are scarce (Knight, 1921; Schumpeter, 1934) has 
been around for a long time, but the realization that talented, knowledgeable, savvy, VC 
investment managers are also scarce and central to the ICT startup/seed venture industry is new. 
In Israel, the high-tech industry and the equity financing institutions – venture capital funds – 
share an interdependent history.  At the center of this research are questions designed to 
understand VC equity investment managers’ decision-making processes and the programs, such 
as EIR programs, that influence those processes. 
 
EIR Programs   
Entrepreneur/Executive in Residence (EIR) programs are internship programs found 
primarily in Israeli VC firms that are interested in investing in ICT startups (and, to a lesser 
degree, in Israeli offices of US-based VC funds). The EIR programs have been around for some 
time, but as competition for repeat entrepreneurs has grown feverish, Israeli VC ventures are 
relying on it more and more (IVC 5/2005).     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Stages of venture development 
 
VC partners use Entrepreneur/Executive in Residency (EIR) programs to enlist both ideas 
and people asynchronously in what they call a “deal.”  A deal involves the simultaneous 
connection of the right entrepreneurial team, the right idea/vision, the right ICT technological 
market conditions and the right amount of forecasted valuation growth for the new venture.  
Entrepreneurs and executives chosen for the EIR programs usually have been involved in 
a number of startups and, more often than not, have succeeded by taking their ventures public or 
selling them to larger firms. Whatever the case may be, they are considered to have “high status” 
in their particular fields of knowledge. Executives in Residency have achieved this status based 
on their managerial experience while Entrepreneurs in Residency earned their status based on 
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technological and innovation experience. In other words, an EIR has an outstanding record of 
accomplishment (as either an executive or technologist) and joins a VC partnership as an interim 
step to his next venture. 
The EIR program is designed to provide entrepreneurs with the networks, resources and 
tools to identify emerging market segments and business opportunities. In some VCs, EIRs act as 
consultants who specialize in particular industries and can add significant value in terms of 
screening entrepreneurs who pitch to VCs for startup/seed financing. 
 Entrepreneurs/Executives in Residence always play a role in the VC prior to start of the 
venture. Not all entrepreneurs have a previously well-defined concept to the point where it is ripe 
for investment; some do not have a concept at all. However, all are expected to incubate an idea 
while receiving a salary and/or market research support from the VC. Eventually he/she will 
form his/her own venture, or join a team which the VC will fund.  
The fact that the EIR conducts his/her work in the VC offices and may also have other 
dealings with the partners no doubt influences the new venture’s concept. Hoffman & Blakely 
(1987) found that a commitment of employment from the VC positively affected the earlier 
stages of the relationship. 
Israel’s Entrepreneur/Executive in Residence programs are based on the VCs’ need to 
better predict through variegated experience of individuals the how, why, when and where of 
their new successful innovative venture. Venture capital executives assert that the ventures 
associated with an EIR program will sell for a higher price (Jacobius, 2004) when it comes time 
for the venture capitalist to exit the deal (venture).  
VCs mostly use the EIR programs to buffer the asynchronous stages of a deal creation. In 
a perfect deal, the entrepreneur walks in with a great team, great idea and at just the best time in 
the marketplace. Statistically, this is an extremely rare occurrence. To ensure that startup/seed 
stage ventures are worthy of investment, the VCs typically manipulate the deal. When the vision 
is less than perfect, they use an Entrepreneur in Residency to improve the idea; when the team is 
less than perfect, they use an Executive in Residency to manage and monitor the venture (Figure 
1).  
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Figure 1. EIR and trust (entrepreneur or idea) 
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The Equity Gap 
A startup/seed information and communication (ICT) venture usually consists only of an 
idea (vision) and a management/ entrepreneurial team; typically it has no income and faces 
uncertain market conditions (customers and competitors are unclear). Seeking and obtaining 
external financing at this startup/seed stage may be extremely difficult (Wetzel, 1983). 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Primary sources of funding in Israeli startup/seed ventures 
 
This is particularly due to the equity gap that exists for ICT firms (Figure 2) (Wetzel, 
1986; Wetzel & Freear, 1994; Mason & Harrison, 1996). This equity gap is best defined as “the 
small amounts of risk capital from institutional sources for ventures at the startup/seed stage 
which arise because of the fixed costs of investment appraisal and monitoring that make it 
uneconomic for venture capital funds to make small investments and also because of the 
reluctance of banks to make unsecured lending” (Mason, 1996). 
Although the presence of equity gap is clear, its cause is ambiguous. Traditionally, the 
gap has been attributed to a shortage of risk capital in the marketplace (Freear & Wetzel, 1991; 
Duxbury, Haines and Ridding, 1996; Wetzel, 1983). The explanation has been modified and now 
the gap also is attributed to fragmentation of the marketplace, where financial markets cannot 
freely provide all relevant information about fund sources, investment opportunities and financial 
control to the buyers and sellers of risk capital for startup/seed stage ventures (Wetzel, 1983; 
Wetzel and Wilson, 1985). ICT startup/seed ventures have always been characterized by very 
high levels of information asymmetries between the entrepreneur (who is selling a piece of his 
vision) and the venture capitalist (who is buying equity in someone else’s dream). 
Two schools of thought have been used to explain the equity gap for ICT startup/seed 
stage ventures, one concentrating on the demand side and the other on the supply side.  The 
demand side explanation relies on the claims of the suppliers of financing that investment 
proposals (entrepreneurs and their visions) are often low in quality (Van Osnabrugge & 
Robinson, 2000). The supply side explanation suggests that the preferences and lending practices 
of institutional equity investors restrict investment regardless of the level of available funds 
(Mason & Harrison, 1992). These restrictive practices are due to the small size of the desired 
investment and to the fact that the transaction (costs during due diligence stages) and monitoring 
costs (costs of managing their investment during the initial startup/seed stage) alone, without 
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considering the risk factors, may make it unfeasible for venture firms to offer funding (Alvarez, 
et. al., 1997; Mason and Harrison, 1992).  
Even though the potential for higher returns is generally recognized, no more than a low 
percentage (Table 1) of venture capital fund portfolios focus primarily on such investments, 
mostly because successfully managing the risks of startup/seed investments demands more from 
the investment team than the traditional monitoring approach used for later stage investments 
(Roberts & Tempest, 1998).  
 The perceived costs forecasted by the VC partner, while calculating the return on 
investment for a decision to invest in a venture, result from certain links between different types 
of trust, control and risk  (Giudici and Paleari, 2000; Shepherd, D. 1999, Cope, Cave and Eccles, 
2004). 
Only by understanding these relationships can we explain the equity gap phenomenon. In 
our equity gap framework, EIR programs are the variable that connects trust, control and risk.  
 
Risk   
  Perceived risk is different from uncertainty, because risk perception usually relates to the 
estimated probabilities of several negative outcomes. In the literature, this focus on the negative 
outcomes of risk taking has been generally acknowledged to be the most relevant (March and 
Shapira, 1987). In making decisions about whether to invest in a venture, VCs consider two 
types of risk: relational risk and performance risk. 
Relational risk relates to the consequences of not having satisfactory cooperation or 
opportunistic behavior by the entrepreneur (Das and Teng, 1996). Performance risk relates to the 
probability and consequences that the venture objectives will not be achieved, either due to a 
performance failure by the entrepreneurial team or due to poor understanding of the ICT market. 
(Das and Teng, 1996).  
 
Trust 
This paper will use the term trust (the subjective state of having positive expectations) 
interchangeably with that of trusting (the behavioral consequences of trust).  
 Trust is an essential aspect of healthy human relationships (Handy, 1999). Trust and 
trusting relationships are important aspects of building business alliances and, at an even more 
basic level, they are essential to the well being of individuals (Flores and Solomon, 1998). 
Humans are more likely to engage in dialog, share information and build ventures with people 
whom they trust (Flores and Solomon, 1998).   
 The health of a business venture depends on the trusting relationships of its agents. Trust 
promotes network relations (Miles and Snow, 1992) and reduces harmful conflict and transaction 
costs (Meyerson, Weick and Kramer, 1996). Ventures with a high level of trust foster a sense of 
community in which everyone takes responsibility for the venture and its well being (Gibb, 
1991). Trust entails a positive expectation about the entrepreneur, suggesting that unpleasant 
outcomes are less likely (Lane and Bachman, 1996).  
Trust (both trusting others and being trustworthy) is related to the character of individuals 
and their relationships (Flores and Solomon, 1998). Trust is not one dimensional, but changes 
character in an iterative process as a relationship develops and individuals’ knowledge of the 
other person grows (Lewicki & Bunker 1995, 1996): “Calculus-based trust,” which exists in the 
early stages of a relationship is the economic calculation of the value of maintaining the 
relationship relative to the costs of severing it. “Knowledge-based trust” exists between two 
individuals who have a history with each other and know each other well enough to make 
predictions about the other. “Identification-based trust” exists because the parties effectively 
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understand and appreciate the other’s wants to the extent that each can effectively act for the 
other.  
Risk must be incorporated in the definition of trust because trust is only relevant in risky 
situations. Without uncertainty of outcome, trust has no role of any consequence (Boon and 
Holmes, 1991; Coleman, 1990; Deutsch, 1958). In other words, trust represents the positive 
expectations regarding the other in a risky situation (Boon and Holmes, 1991; Gambetta, 1988) 
and the behavioral reliance on the other in a risky situation (Hosmer, 1995; Moorman, et al 
1992).  
The greater the ability to rely on trust, the less the risk inherent in a transaction (Ring and 
Van de Ven, 1992; Madhok, 1995). An entrepreneur’s trustworthiness reduces agency costs, 
protecting the VC (principal) against any harmful behavior by the entrepreneur (agent). 
However, trustworthiness delineates only the entrepreneur’s intentions to do appropriate things, 
not his ability to accomplish them. 
Trust in a VC-E (venture capital partner and the entrepreneur) relationship can take 
several forms.  By becoming a member of the EIR program, in a first tier VC partnership, a high-
status entrepreneur transfers legitimacy to the VC and vice versa (Fried & Hisrich, 1995). 
Competence-based trust is based on expectations of technically competent role performance 
(Barber, 1983), ability and expertise (Mayer, et al, 1995). An entrepreneur’s competence 
suggests a high probability of accomplishment ⎯ but it concerns only the ability to do 
appropriate things, not the intention to do so.  
An entrepreneur’s competence influences venture funding by mitigating the liability of 
newness (Stinchcombe, 1965), conferring status and legitimacy (Blau & Duncan, 1967), 
affecting capabilities and skills (Becker, 1975), and shaping the resource networks of the 
entrepreneur (Burt, 1992; Granovetter, 1974).  
Status/legitimacy is a highly valued entrepreneurial competency. Entrepreneurs who 
possess legitimacy can more easily obtain necessary resources than those who do not (Hannan & 
Freeman, 1989). High-status entrepreneurs will generate the necessary legitimacy to motivate 
potential investors, employees and other stakeholders to reallocate resources to the new venture. 
Their status gives the stakeholders more confidence in the proposed ideas and makes them more 
likely to attribute high value to those ideas (Shane & Khurana, 2001). In the case of an invention, 
evaluators will rely on the status of the inventor in making decisions about the opportunity 
(Merton, 1973).  
Another entrepreneurial competency⎯the ability to identify opportunities⎯has been 
recognized as one of the most important abilities of successful entrepreneurs (Ardichvili, 
Cardozo & Ray, 2003). Opportunity identification may be related to, among other factors, 
entrepreneurial alertness (Kirzner, 1973), prior knowledge (Shane, 2000), social networks 
(Singh, Hills, Hybels, & Lumpkin, 1999), entrepreneurial cognition (Baron, 1998) and potential 
financial reward (Schumpeter, 1976).  
 
Control 
 Control refers to the establishment and use of formal rules, procedures and policies to 
monitor and reward desirable performance. It is the process by which venture goals are set and 
the ways they will be measured and evaluated (work plan checked against measures and 
objectives as preset in the business plan) (Geringer and Hebert, 1989). Control also focuses on 
process, which turns appropriate behavior into a desirable output. It is the measurement of 
behavior itself, not merely the final output. 
  Control is a process of regulation and monitoring designed to make elements of a system 
more predictable (Leifer and Mills 1996) for the achievement of a certain goal, standard or 
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purpose (Green and Welsh, 1988). More generally, control can be viewed as any process that is 
intended to affect the behavior of other people (Sohn, 1994). 
 Once an investment in a startup/seed venture is made, the investment is illiquid, and its 
success is highly dependent on a small group of managers/entrepreneurs in the venture (Fried & 
Hisrich, 1994). It is in the interests of both entrepreneurs and VC fund partners to do everything 
possible to ensure control that will allow them to collaborate effectively (Tyebjee and Bruno, 
1984). 
Control can take place across the whole spectrum of managerial activity, from strategic 
planning to operational matters. VCs can be vigorous and influential board members and play a 
significant part in shaping operating strategies (Rosenstein, 1988).  
Mainly because of time constraints, VCs tend not to become over-involved in day-to-day 
operations unless control measures show that major problems have arisen; assistance most 
frequently includes help in raising additional funds, strategic planning and management 
recruitment (Gorman & Sahlman, 1989). Paradoxically, a more intense level of involvement by 
VCs does not necessarily mean that ventures will operate better than they would with limited 
involvement (MacMillan et al., 1989). 
Determining an appropriate control mode depends on two factors: 1) an 
understanding of the transformation process in which appropriate behaviors are to take place 
and 2) the ability to measure outputs precisely and objectively. The VC has two needs for 
control: the need to control the entrepreneur and the need to control the venture. 
This study recognizes the intricate relationship between trust and control. On one hand, 
control is detrimental to trust because regulation implies a sense of mistrust (Argyris, 1952). On 
the other hand, proper control mechanisms increase trust because “objective” rules and “clear” 
measures help to institute a track record for people who do their jobs well (Goold and Campbell, 
1987; Sitkin, 1995). 
 
 
Study Design 
 
Research Question 
Much has been written about how VC partners check entrepreneurial ventures before they 
invest (Cable and Shane, 1997; Hoffman and Blakely, 1987; Amit et. al., 1990; Bruton et. al, 
1997; etc.) and how they forecast the new venture performance (Brush and Vanderwerf, 1992; 
Cooper et al, 1994, etc.). However, a review of the literature did not yield any studies concerning 
the ability of VCs to reduce the amount of risk they include in the forecast of future ROI, nor 
about influencing the performance itself at the pre-birth stage of ventures (startup/seed stage). 
The idea for this research came from the knowledge that many repeat entrepreneurs were 
being hired as EIRs at the Israeli based VCs (local and locally based US VCs).  In the absence of 
literature about the EIR process and its outcomes, we were motivated to ask: 
 
How do participants in EIR programs perceive the value of the program? 
 
How does the supplementary relationship between trust and control influence the VC decision to 
invest in a specific “deal?” Could we identify the specific dimensions of trust and control that 
influence the VC’s “confidence coefficient,” based on EIR program characteristics?  
 
Our initial conceptual model is shown in Figure 3 below: 
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Trust-building 
Fund the 
Venture?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Preliminary conceptual model 
 
We were interested in examining the characteristics of trust and control that operate in an 
EIR environment from the perspectives of the principals active in it – both VC partners and 
entrepreneurs. We positioned trust and control as independent variables in our model and sought 
to capture how individuals collaborating in an EIR perceived how they affect the venture funding 
decision. Specifically, we were interested in understanding how the relationship between the VC 
partner and EIR would mediate the influence of trust and control on funding. We also wanted to 
look at how government risk-reducing programs and investment syndicates moderated the VC-
EIR relationship to affect the funding decision. 
 
Research Method 
 The research involved a grounded qualitative approach based on semi-structured 
interviews (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). We chose this methodology because the intent of the 
study was to build theory about the barriers to and enablers of success in Israeli EIR programs 
and doing so required a deep understanding of the attitudes, beliefs and perceptions of 
individuals involved in them. Semi-structured interviews allowed us to generate general 
information about the dynamics of EIRs as well as to probe people’s perceptions about how 
highly subjective factors, such as trust and controls, are perceived to operate within them. As 
new ideas emerged from our interviews, we returned to the literature, thereby iteratively 
enriching our understanding of the constructs in our original conceptual model and consequently 
revising the model to reflect the knowledge yielded by our data.  
 
Sample 
  Selection of the subjects for the study was done through criterion-based selection 
(Maxwell, 1941). This is a strategy in which particular settings, persons, or activities are selected 
deliberately to provide information that cannot be obtained as well from other choices. The 
people chosen were able to describe EIR programs and their results because they were part of 
EIR programs, either as VC partners or entrepreneurs. We looked only for primary decision 
Trust 
Other 
Risk Reducing 
 Programs 
Dependent 
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Moderating 
Variables 
Independent Variables 
EIR Program Characteristics 
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makers in the VC firms (CEO) and the entrepreneurs in EIR programs (different stages).  We 
also interviewed three outside observers: a bi-national technology foundation vice president who 
funds early stage ventures (Table 2); an angel investor who was previously a successful repeat 
entrepreneur; and an entrepreneur who had started a venture without an EIR program.                                           
We were interested only in VCs that invested in ICT startup/seed ventures. Of the 57 VCs 
in Israel in that category (out of sixty-two active VC partnerships), we interviewed the chief 
executives of ten firms. The total capital raised by all VCs in Israel from 2000-2004 was $5.6 
billion; our sample included VCs that raised $2.3 billion (41 percent of the total).  
The VC CEOs whom we interviewed represented the two different types of VC 
partnerships that participate in the Israeli scene: Five were from Israeli offices of Silicon Valley 
VCs and five were from local Israeli VCs. We also differentiated the sample on the basis of firm 
size. We included two “big” VCs (funds between $331M and $850M), three “medium” VCs 
(funds between $ 150M and $330M) and five “smaller” VCs (funds between $60M and $150M) 
(Table 3). Our “entrepreneurial” sample (Table 4) included two EIRs in the resident phase, two 
EIRs who had crossed the equity gap during the last year and an entrepreneur (non EIR) who had 
crossed the equity gap two years previously. 
 
 
Source: IVC Research Center 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Data about the VC-CEOs interviewed 
 
Table 4. Entrepreneur data 
 
 
 
 
© 2006 Sprouts 6(2), pp 84-124, http://sprouts.case.edu/2006/060203.pdf                                        94
                             Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/6-3
SCHWARZKOPF/CLOSING THE “EQUITY GAP” IN STARTUP INVESTMENTS IN IT VENTURES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Investor background 
 
Table 6. Entrepreneur background 
 
All except one of our investor interviewees (Table 5) were male. All were in their fifties, 
lived in the central region of Israel, served in the Israel Defense Forces, were technologically 
savvy and had extensive managerial experience. Nine of the 12 were repeat entrepreneurs. The 
entrepreneurial interviewees (Table 6) had the same backgrounds as the investors except for all 
being in their thirties.  
 
Interview Protocol 
The data was collected through semi-structured interviews that lasted no more than 90 
minutes each. The interviewing (in English) was done during July and August 2005 in the 
interviewees’ offices, which were located mostly in the Dan Area of Israel (Israel’s version of 
Silicon Valley). The interviews were taped and transcribed for analysis and anonymity of the 
participants was ensured. Most of the questions focused on EIR programs, startup/seed 
investment and respondent’s respective experience in crossing the equity gap. The interviews 
were designed to elicit interviewees’ perceptions of high-status individuals, venture and 
entrepreneurial performance, VC’s non-financial investments, perceptions of the relationship 
between the parties (before, during and after the EIR programs), definitions and stages of trust 
and similarity of backgrounds (especially their experiences in the Israel Defense Forces and its 
influences) (see Appendix A). 
 
Coding and Analysis    
 We coded the interviews in eight iterations. For the first two iterations, we used a 
spreadsheet and cataloged part of the answers. After the third iteration, we needed a tool for 
analyzing responses related to relationships; for this, we used Microsoft’s OneNote 2003. This 
application allowed us to take apart, catalog and search for quotes in the interview transcripts 
(Appendix B).  
 The first iteration helped us to discover how the participants felt about the program: 
whether they would repeat it; if they would recommend it to another VC or entrepreneur; and 
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if/how they believed it achieved expected results.  For this part of the coding, we used simple 
Excel spreadsheets.  
The second iteration yielded insights on EIR program definitions, VC-EIR relationships, 
VC-EIR background similarities, and other risk-reducing incentives (such as government 
incentives and syndicates). 
The third iteration validated our early conjecture that the relationship between trust, trust 
building and future control costs was important. We realized at this point, however, that the 
mediating variable that influenced the VC CEOs to fund the venture was not the relationship 
between the VC and the EIR, but something we termed “confidence coefficient of the deal” 
(reflecting frequent use of that term by the VCs interviewed). The confidence coefficient is the 
VC’s confidence in the entrepreneur’s intention and ability to deliver the deal’s return on 
investment. This motivated us to revise the conceptual model before continuing the coding so as 
to reflect this change in mediating variables (from the relationship between the EIR and the VC 
to the VC deal confidence coefficient) (Figure 5). 
When, in our fourth iteration, we coded for the confidence coefficient, we discovered that 
it was inversely related to the perceived risk in the forecasted venture valuation gains. 
The fifth iteration coded for perceptions and determinants of failure (failure of repeat 
entrepreneurs and failure of ventures). 
In the sixth iteration, we coded for different types of perceived costs and their 
relationships with control, trust building and trust. Here we discovered that our respondents 
distinguished between different types of risk, trust and control. This caused us to return to the 
literature to review research involving these constructs.   
 
 
 
  
Control  
 
 
 
 
VC-DEAL 
Confidence 
Coefficient 
Fund 
Venture? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 5. New model 
 
For the next two iterations, we borrowed from the literature an existing framework 
providing definitions of risk, control and trust for strategic alliances (Das and Teng, 2001). The 
use of this framework helped us to discover and define the trust and control types that play a part 
in the EIR program and how they affect the confidence coefficient of the VC CEOs. We used the 
Trust 
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framework to code for two trust constructs (goodwill trust and competence trust) and three 
control constructs (behavior, output and social controls).  
Our coding resulted in a revision of our original conceptual model as described and 
discussed in the next two sections. 
 
 
Findings 
 
Our data confirmed the general assumption underpinning the original conceptual model: 
that trust and control are critical factors driving EIR success. We learned, however, that the role 
trust and control play in the EIR process is far more intricate than we had conjectured. Our 
respondents revealed, for example, that they distinguish between two types of trust and three 
types of control. Borrowing from the work by Das and Teng (2001) we refer to those as 
competence trust, goodwill trust, behavior control, output control and social control. 
 
Trust  
Our findings indicate that two contrasting types of trust operate in the EIR context: 
competence-based trust and goodwill trust. The first is the ability to accomplish (see Figure 6) 
while the second is the intention to accomplish (see Figure 7). 
 
Competence Trust.  Our respondents reported that trust in the competence of 
entrepreneurs who participate in residency programs was crucial to them. Competence trust was 
developed in the EIR-VC relationship in two ways: through research and demonstration. VCs 
reported that they actively research the competence and trustworthiness of entrepreneurs by 
using personal and professional networks to obtain information about the entrepreneur’s past 
relationships with investors. In addition, they purposely expose entrepreneurs to a variety of VC 
activities that require demonstration of their competencies and skills.  
Respondents reported that their network-based research on entrepreneurs was focused in 
large part on identifying the “status” of these individuals which was perceived as evidence of or 
contributing to competence.  Attributes characteristic of preferred “high” status individuals 
included 1) previous venture founding experience (although not necessarily successful) 
demonstrating the skill and fortitude necessary to create and manage an organization; 2) service 
as an officer in a prestigious combat unit (fighter pilot, commando and other elite forces) 
demonstrating leadership and teamwork skills; 3) experience in the market as a customer (in the 
IDF computer units) or supplier (in software development), possessing information not publicly 
available about the ICT technology. 
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COMPETENCE TRUST 
(Expectation of ability to accomplish goals) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Competence trust 
 
Goodwill Trust. Our respondents distinguished a second type of trust that we have 
labeled “goodwill” trust, which they reported may be influenced by cultural factors or be 
developed through institutional efforts.  Homogeneity of social and professional background and 
status, similar values/norms and preexisting mutual interests, for example, were reported to 
engender trust and reduce conflict among EIR participants. In addition, VC created programs 
such as internships and purposefully constructed “incremental step” processes were seen to foster 
goodwill and increase commitment among EIR participants.  
“Most entrepreneurs do not have the experience 
…(that) EIRs are expected to ‘have…to enter 
into the market, build the right company (and) 
be successful outside of Israel.” 
“All those people have actually 
operational experience some way 
or the other. I mean you don't take 
EIR h did
“Some funds will have EIRs because 
technology changes and it's very important to   
mix experience, knowledge and new 
developments in technology.” 
“(EIRs) are capable to take an early stage 
idea and build a company around it…(They) 
can  make things work out of an 
idea…create something out of nothing. 
“Entrepreneurs in residence must be people 
that really have "wet" their hands or ‘dirtied’ 
their hands…” 
 
“The EIR helped us with domain expertise 
…helped us in our deal flow. When we found a 
company he led the due diligence process.” 
 
“Entrepreneurs that are more technology 
oriented are the ones that will invent the great 
ideas for you, and the ones that are more in the 
managerial side will enable you to, make your 
dream come true.” 
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 Error!
 
 
 
GOODWILL TRUST 
  (Expectation of intention to accomplish goals) 
 
 “You can talk to them. You can evaluate 
their personality, their vision, their 
ability to execute and take risk.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Control 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.  Goodwill trust 
 
 
Control 
Our findings indicate that VC principals consider control to be a very important criterion 
in ensuring a new venture’s success. In discussing control, our participants differentiated 
between three distinct types that resemble those widely accepted in the literature: behavior, 
output and social control (Eisenhardt, 1985). For clarity, therefore, we have used these 
established labels to report them.  
 
Behavior Control. Our respondents reported that they used policies and procedures to 
clarify the roles and responsibilities of entrepreneurs participating in EIR programs and to 
supervise, monitor and assess compliance. All of the VC executives we interviewed reported 
making both formal and informal efforts (though mostly informal) to ensure behavioral 
compliance of participants in their EIR programs. These included training in VC ROI goals, deal 
flow investment rules, venture validation methodology, business plan rules and working with 
boards.  
VCs were careful to point out that, while they believed behavior controls were necessary, 
they were best implemented somewhat informally. Although entrepreneurs are mature, high 
status, quite experienced and highly successful individuals, their entrepreneurial personalities 
preclude the imposition of rigid rules and regulations.   
“We are getting into this process of working 
together, I like his ideas.  His ideas fit my 
own way of doing business and they are also 
good.”  
“You trust…EIRs one hundred percent, one 
thousand percent, day and night.”  
 
“(How do I)…define trust between EIRs 
and VCs? ‘No surprises’.” 
 
“(There is accord) regarding agreements, 
what to do with the commercial aspect, 
what to do with the bank. They will also 
follow me blindly.” 
“Only someone who invests 150% of 
himself and more in the company might 
bec me essential.”  
 
“…people need to have the 
experience of working  together, 
know how they think, how they 
“Where you were in the army will influence 
my decision...I look for)...someone who came 
from a certain background… went through 
certain things and can do difficult things…” 
k Th i hi h l
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All EIRs were strategically (yet informally) exposed to all VC personnel, new project 
proposals, existing investments and other entrepreneurs in the investment portfolio. The reported 
purpose was to indoctrinate entrepreneurs about “the way things are done here.” The VC 
interviewees emphasized that, while the EIR program had no strings attached and after the one 
year there would be no obligation, it was important that while the program was ongoing, 
entrepreneurs in residence should “fit in” to the firm. 
 While making proactive efforts to facilitate this fitting in, the VCs ensured that 
entrepreneurs also were responsible for getting “out and around” the firm independently, 
lobbying for meetings and getting on agendas, brainstorming with partners, etc.  
Our data showed that the EIRs understood and appreciated the importance of the 
behavior mechanisms used by the VCs. Although all our EIR respondents had been repeat 
entrepreneurs, they reported that the experience of being inside the VC ⎯ where they could 
more easily understand its mechanisms and goals ⎯ was extremely helpful in later due diligence 
and board dealings. 
The EIRs also acknowledged feeling “mentored” by one or more of the VC partners 
(usually individuals with similar technology domain experience). They believed that their 
mentors had taken the internship very seriously, investing ample time in meetings and 
brainstorming sessions with them. 
Our respondents also noted that specific VC “behavior” control continues once a venture 
gets funded – and then becomes increasingly formal. At that point, all VCs reported that strict 
policies and procedures, incorporated as part of all investment contracts, specified acceptable 
boundaries of behavior (and the rewards associated with rule compliance). They also revealed 
the presence of strict reporting structures providing role specification for everyone in the venture 
and explained their beliefs that such purposeful articulation about roles facilitates the process of 
supervision and monitoring.  
 
 
 
 
BEHAVIOR CONTROL 
(Measurement of behavior rather than final output) 
 
                             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Behavior control 
 
Output Control. Our respondents defined the EIR internship as a first step in getting the 
entrepreneurs into the VCs’ constant evaluation and measurement routine against proposed plans 
and forecasted expenses.  All VC CEOs described establishing objectives and performance 
measures to measure/evaluate EIR output and allow the VC to exercise control over 
“We control our companies from the start 
preparing for a possible acquisition or an IPO 
– no last minute management style…” 
 
“EIRs give VCs some level of comfort that 
they have executives that know their 
rules…” 
 
“Our investors want us to manage the fund in 
a very “AMERICAN” way so we impose 
control from the beginning.” 
 
“Our VC firm helps (EIRs) build the human 
capital for marketing, for financing for 
legal stuff, and provide them guidance 
working with boards.” 
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performance. The VC CEOs also confirmed that they expected from their entrepreneurs detailed 
reports of work plans, business plans, budgets, etc. After they invest in the venture, our VC 
respondents understand that equity stake does not automatically give them the right/ability to set 
their own output measures as the norm; this is a subject open while negotiating investment 
syndicates. 
 
  
OUTPUT CONTROL 
(Objective rules and clear measures) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Output control 
 
Social Control. Our data documents that a third type of control called “social control,” 
which is widely described in the literature as being typical in the operation of strategic alliances, 
was also present in the EIR context.   
We learned that, unlike internship programs where novices are under the strict tutelage of 
supervisors, EIR programs attract young, experienced and successful repeat entrepreneurs who 
would chafe under rigid governance and whose creativity and drive would be compromised by it. 
Participants in EIR programs are closer to peers than fledglings. For this reason VCs 
report that social controls, while important, must operate very delicately.  We found that social 
control operated informally to generate the kind of collegial work environment necessary to 
facilitate collaboration between VCs and entrepreneurs.  
Our respondents understood the unique relationship between entrepreneur and VC. One 
needs the other to exist. In this relationship, the entrepreneurs are not the risk bearers; their 
function is to innovate. Risk bearing is the function of the venture capitalist that lends money to 
the entrepreneurs (Schumpeter, 1934; Acs et. al. 2005). 
The VCs said they believed that optimal outcomes were most likely if the goals of 
entrepreneurs were synonymous with those of the VCs and reported that conflict of interest 
between the VC and the entrepreneurial team was a prime cause of venture failure. Although the 
VCs reported efforts to promote goal congruence, they clarified that the goals were entirely 
defined by the VC who, in an effort to encourage EIRs to conform to the goals, tried to create an 
atmosphere conducive to sharing them.  
Respondents reported that, to make certain that entrepreneurs understood the goals of VC 
management and investors, they devised activities in which entrepreneurs could contribute to and 
discuss the goals. An example is due diligence negotiations with other entrepreneurs as part of 
the VC team. 
“…we are very much involved in the control 
of the company, (but) as the company grows 
we become less and less involved…” 
 
“We felt that we really have to fold up our 
sleeves so we can help the entrepreneurs 
formulate the working plan and goals…” 
 
“…every fund is controlling in its own 
way…We expect them (entrepreneurs) to 
manage according to (their business) plan.” 
 
“…all our VC partners came with a 
tremendous amount of experience and we 
work (put controls) with all our 
companies…” 
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 VCs told us how they and the EIRs agree to the investment vision and returns through a 
decision-making process that ensures that VC preferences are understood and integrated into 
mutually acceptable goals and plans. As a result, many of our respondents – both VCs and 
entrepreneurs – described the EIR internship culture using terms such as “communicative,” 
“collegial,” and “consultative.” All respondents displayed an understanding of the importance of 
a positive, supportive and interactive work environment that fostered trust, confidence and 
interdependence.  
All parties in the program reported as critical the importance of honest and open 
communication.  To this end, VCs reported instituting mechanisms to encourage and facilitate 
information exchange. These ranged from staging cross-functional meetings and other activities 
to promoting social interaction between entrepreneurs and others in the VC and introducing 
organizational ideas that could be translated into behavioral models to guide decisions about 
their ventures.  
The VCs also made sure that communication with entrepreneurs would be efficient and 
expedient. Mentor VCs and EIRs reported receiving from each other six or eight e-mails per day 
about certain subjects. VCs also reported that they opened their networks, both personal and 
professional, to entrepreneurs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOCIAL CONTROL 
(Minimizing conflict of interest) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Social control 
 
Our interviews also revealed a consensus between all CEOs of the VCs as to the main 
reasons for failures of young non-EIR ventures and the remedies for such failures as described 
by trust and control. According to our respondents failures in the first phase of the life of an ICT 
startup/seed venture in Israel are attributed to:  
“He knows that if there are changes in the plans 
I will always speak with him and consult with 
him, so basically he is not surprised by bad 
news, or by…activities that could surprise 
hi ”
“you can make millions of dollars but 
it won't be a big market for a VC. So 
basically by choosing an EIR program 
you are limited to their ideas.” 
h k f C ”
“We (VC partners and EIR) have a weekly 
 3 hour meeting, brainstorming on ideas and on 
companies...so I get my own ideas, do some 
presentations and they give me feedback.”   
 
“We actually came up with ideas that were 
really good ideas and you can make very nice 
companies around those ideas, but they were 
not a good fit for the VC and I had to abandon 
them.”  
“As the founder you want to make sure that  
you're spending your time on something 
that makes sense and can make money, and 
as VCs they want to make their money 
work on something that makes sense and 
then will make more money.”  
“A company that can make millions and can be 
sold for 20-30 million dollars…it's good for 
me, especially if I have interesting equity there, 
but for the venture capital fund it's not 
interesting…” 
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1.Entrepreneurial team in-fighting and eventual inability to execute. This was reported to 
occur because not enough effort was made by the VCs (during due diligence) to make 
sure the team was of similar backgrounds and/or had mutual interests. It is quite common 
for VCs today to change parts of the team as a condition for investment.  Our VC 
respondents believed that common backgrounds helped to ensure more goodwill trust 
among team members and that social control helped to fortify shared norms and values 
that increased that trust. 
2.Poor international marketing and sales. Our respondents noted that VCs now look for 
repeat entrepreneurs that have this type of experience even if the first time around it was 
not very successful.  By including sales/marketing prowess as part of what constitutes 
competence trust, VCs reduce risk of failure.  
3.Inability of entrepreneur to let go and start anew. VCs reported that the most important 
thing they look for in an entrepreneur is the ability to understand and trust product 
changes dictated by the board. Goal congruence, fortified by social control, is seen by 
VCs to fuel the goodwill trust that motivates EIRs to accept VC decisions.  
4.Conflict of interest between the VC and entrepreneurial team. This reported source of 
failure, the VCs indicated, is also remedied by strong goodwill trust. 
 
The VC CEOs interviewed explained to us that VC partners use two sources of funds: 
deal-flow investment monies and the VC’s management fee (usually 2 percent per year).  The 
transaction costs associated with forming and financing new ventures and the monitoring costs 
borne by the VC firm come out of the management fee. Although costs of making new equity 
investments in startup/seed ventures have been decreasing, they still can account for as much as 
10 percent to 15 percent of the initial investment. All VCs interviewed talked about using 
government incentives and VC syndicates to reduce these costs (Table 7).  
 
 
 
Table 7. VC control and other risk reducing tools 
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Transaction costs include entrepreneurial evaluation, technological evaluation, due 
diligence and, finally, the signing of a contract. Our interviewees mentioned that, because 
startup/seed companies have no performance history, they are difficult to evaluate. The most 
important factor that influences perceived transaction costs, all VCs told us, is the need to 
forecast team behavior.  
Monitoring costs include the time spent by employees of the VC firm in establishing and 
later controlling activities in the new venture. Some of our VCs offered BPO (business process 
outsourcing of financial, H/R and other functions) services (Table 7) to the young firms at the 
beginning, because it was cheaper than controlling them. With time and venture sophistication, 
these functions were transferred to the venture. 
All interviewees told us that EIR programs are financed through the deal flow monies. 
When the EIR joins the VC, a formal company is formed with the entrepreneur as its sole owner. 
The monies are invested through a convertible loan. If the VC decides to invest the loan, it is 
discounted at a predetermined rate. If the entrepreneur takes the venture to be funded somewhere 
else, the loan has to be repaid. It is like buying an option to invest.  The decision to start the 
process of due diligence is based on the forecasted future valuation increase (based on the 
technological validation) and the forecasted transaction/monitoring costs (based on the 
entrepreneurial team behavior).  
All investors agreed about the need for -- and high cost of -- VC partners’ involvement in 
controlling the young ventures, and that this cost was reduced by EIR involvement prior to the 
investment.  
Finally, our data suggest that VCs and EIRs perceived the program to be highly valuable 
for both sides. (Appendix B, Figure 11 and Tables 7 and 8). Of the 10 VC CEOs interviewed, all 
except one voiced the intention to continue EIR programs. Our sample VCs employed 36 EIRs at 
all stages of the program and a total of 204 startup/seed ventures in their portfolio. 
Our findings about the roles of trust and control in EIR programs in Israel motivated us to 
amend our original conceptual model to more precisely explain VC decisions to invest in EIR 
deals (Figure 12). The sole independent variables in our original model were trust and control; in 
our refined model, independent variables include perceived transaction and monitoring costs and, 
antecedent to them, the two types of trust and three types of control that our sample revealed as 
operating in EIR programs.  Perceived transaction and monitoring costs are seen to influence the 
“confidence coefficient” that, in turn, drives VCs’ decision to fund an EIR initiated venture. The 
overall findings are summarized in Table 9 and the revised model is shown in Figure 12. 
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  Table 8. EIR programs at the VC sample 
 
  
ENTREPRENEUR PERCEPTIONS 
of EIR Advantages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Entrepreneur perceptions of being part of the EIR program 
 
“When you are outside of a VC and you 
think of an idea it's difficult…You have to 
use your own connections…But here, when 
you are coming from within…it's quite easy 
to get you any meeting you want, and it's like 
you are doing it…in a luxury environment, 
and that's really good.” 
“When my friends...had (an) idea, they 
started courting the venture capital firms, 
go(ing) from one to the other and it's not an 
easy process, especially when you are not 
known. Now that I am inside I know that 
it's true.” 
“A VC firm will help in the human 
infrastructure, bringing chairmen with 
domain expertise or other key personnel to 
help in introductions to potential 
customers.” 
“(The VCs) also helped me with validation… 
they helped me with their connections and it 
was very useful, very helpful.”  
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Figure 12. EIR framework 
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Trust and control are critical factors driving EIR success.  
Two contrasting types of trust operate in the EIR context: 
1) Competence-based trust (the ability to accomplish) which comprises 
A) previous venture founding experience demonstrating the skill and fortitude necessary to create and 
manage an organization; 
B) service as an officer in a prestigious combat unit demonstrating leadership and teamwork skills; and 
C) experience in the market as a customer or supplier, possessing information not publicly available about 
the ICT technology. 
2) Goodwill trust (the intention to accomplish) which is  
• influenced by cultural factors such as 
o homogeneity of social and professional background and status 
o similar values/norms and preexisting mutual interests 
• developed by institutional efforts such as  
o VC-created programs such as internships  
o “incremental step” processes 
 
Three types of control operate in the EIR context: 
1) Behavior control 
• policies and procedures designed to clarify roles and responsibilities of entrepreneurs participating in EIR 
programs  
• supervision, monitoring and assessment for compliance purposes  
• training (formal and informal) in topics such as: 
o VC ROI goals 
o deal flow investment rules 
o venture validation methodology 
o business plan rules  
o working with boards 
2) Output control (optimizing performance) 
• objectives and performance metrics designed to measure and evaluate EIR output  
• detailed reports (work plans, business plans, budgets, etc) designed to give the VC control over the EIR’s 
performance 
3) Social control (minimizing conflict of interest) 
• create a collegial, consultative culture (with EIRs and VCs on the level of peers) 
• promote goal congruence 
• encourage frequent and transparent communications 
There is a need for -- and high cost of -- VC partners’ involvement in controlling young ventures. This cost is 
reduced by EIR involvement prior to the investment.  
VCs appear to use EIR programs to reduce the risks ⎯ the perceived transaction and monitoring costs ⎯ and 
overcome the equity gap obstacle. 
If the VC is to invest in a startup/seed ICT venture, he must perceive a positive confidence coefficient on the future 
success of the venture. The confidence coefficient is based on the perceived transaction costs (forecasted costs of the 
due diligence process) and the perceived monitoring costs (forecasted costs for monitoring the venture during the first 
stage of its life).  
Factors contributing to the confidence coefficient include: 
1) Transaction costs  
• entrepreneurial evaluation (most importantly team behavior) 
• technological evaluation 
• due diligence  
• the signing of a contract 
2) Monitoring costs ⎯ the time spent by employees of the VC firm in establishing and later controlling activities in 
the new venture. 
 
Table 9. Summary of findings 
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Discussion 
 
The relationship between a VC and an entrepreneur is more important to the success of a 
new venture than the capital itself (Greenwood, 1995; Sapienza and Korsgaard, 1996; Cable and 
Shane, 1997; Timmons and Bygrave, 1986; Shepherd and Zacharis, 2001) (Appendix B.5). 
VCs and EIRs form a relationship based on information. Both cultivate knowledge about 
one another by gathering data, seeing each other in different contexts and experiencing each 
other’s previous knowledge. In EIR programs, entrepreneurs co-locate into VC offices, create a 
joint vision for the venture, and share goals and core values relative to it. Eventually, if the 
principals decide to create the venture, they will be able to know and predict one another’s 
(shared) needs and preferences (Appendix B.9). In successful programs, the EIRs will think, feel 
and respond like the partners of “their” home VC fund. 
Our findings help us to understand the connections between the constructs of trust and 
control operating in an EIR program and the “perceived” future costs (of two types) that VCs 
calculate before they decide to enter into validation, due-diligence and investment. The value of 
these forecasted costs may influence the decision of a VC to invest (overcoming the equity gap) 
in a startup/seed company with no performance history. 
Perceived future transaction costs of appraising and validating (due diligence) is mostly 
about entrepreneur-VC opportunistic behaviors. The perceived transaction cost may be 
influenced by the perception of goodwill trust by a VC of an EIR and affected by behavior 
control and social control mechanisms exercised by a VC. The VC (who is diversified among a 
number of portfolio companies) is in a different position than the entrepreneur (who typically has 
his/her financial returns dependent upon the success of this single venture) (Appendix B- section 
8). 
Perceived future monitoring costs (through the first stage of the venture) relates to 
forecasting the costs of controlling for results. In addition to considering whether the venture 
achieves its performance targets, VCs also consider the perceived outcome of the entrepreneur’s 
activities. The perceived future monitoring cost may be influenced by perceptions of competence 
trust in an EIR by a VC, as well as by social and output control mechanisms used by a VC. In 
addition to providing risk capital in exchange for partial ownership of the venture, Israeli VCs 
typically actively involve themselves in the venture (Appendix B.2). Israeli VCs seek to add 
value through their interaction with and advice for the managers of the entrepreneurial venture 
(Macmillian, Kulow & Khoylian, 1989; Bygrave & Timmons, 1992), as well as through their 
monitoring and reorganizing of the companies in which they participate (Sapienza & Gupta, 
1994) (Appendix B.6; B.9) 
Our findings suggest that EIR programs allow a VC to manipulate and reduce the 
perceived transaction costs of appraising and validating (due diligence) the viability of the vision 
(idea) and the perceived monitoring costs (through the first stage of a venture).  
VCs appear to use EIR programs to reduce the perceived forecasted transaction and the 
perceived forecasted monitoring costs in such a way that they reach a tipping point where the 
VCs will invest in a startup/seed stage venture and overcome the equity gap obstacle. 
If the VC is to invest in a startup/seed ICT venture, he must perceive a positive 
confidence coefficient on the future success of the venture. This confidence coefficient is based 
on the perceived transaction costs (forecasted costs of the due diligence process) and the 
perceived monitoring costs (forecasted costs for monitoring the venture during the first stage of 
its life). Both of these costs directly influence the working relationship between the VC and the 
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entrepreneur (EIR in certain cases). A positive “confidence coefficient” will indicate to the VC 
that a “deal” has low perceived transaction and perceived monitoring costs. 
Other factors that influence the confidence coefficient are the state of the ICT-specific 
market conditions, the ability to reduce monitoring costs by including other VCs in a syndicate, 
by using government risk-reducing incentives and by investing only in fields where the VC has 
good technological domain expertise. 
 We portray our conception of a VC’s forecasted investing behavior in Figure 7 below. 
The top quadrants forecast where the VCs will choose to invest given a particular knowledge 
domain (early stage ventures, mezzanine stage ventures and later stage ventures). For VCs to 
overcome the equity gap and invest in the lower left quadrant, they need programs like the EIR. 
This program facilitates VC investment in a venture despite low output measurability. 
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Figure 13. Measurability versus knowledge 
 
VC evaluation of deals occurs only after pre-screening through recommendations, 
invitations to join syndicates, networking, etc. Only 5 percent to 10 percent of pre-screened deals 
are invited for evaluation.  
In normal deal selection, the rule of thumb statistics (Appendix B) suggest that VCs 
invest in one out of every 350 deals that they evaluate (0.03 percent success rate). Through the 
EIR programs, those statistics (for evaluated and then invested ventures) have been changed to 
one out of two or three – a 30 percent to 40 percent success rate. This improvement of over 1,000 
times constitutes a great cost reduction in the screening and evaluation process costs for the VCs 
in their search for startup/seed investments. 
Based on a consensus of VC CEOs in our sample as to the reasons for young non-EIR 
venture failure, we suggest that perceived transaction and monitoring costs of startup deals may 
be reduced by EIR programs in which goodwill trust and competence trust are high and social 
control operates effectively.  
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Figure 14. Minimizing transaction and monitoring costs 
 
Implications and Contribution 
The main contribution of this research is that it addresses a new phenomenon about 
which not much empirical knowledge has been previously generated: 
 
“There is a fundamental market failure in the provision of early-stage financing in both the United States 
and the European Union. Venture Capital funds are concentrating on larger and larger deals, leaving the 
small and risky early-stage deals asides… This can become a self-reinforcing cycle: because few venture 
capital funds are active in the seed and early stage area, they don’t have any longer the necessary 
knowledge to operate there… the recognized benefits from the birth and growth of innovative small firms 
to the economies are such that public sector measures are justified to overcome this market failure…”  
(ECD-USDoC, 2005: 6) 
 
To overcome this “market failure,” programs like EIR (in Israel) should be examined by 
both practitioners (VCs and government agencies) and academicians. Our findings indicate that 
EIR programs are successful and that they help VCs in finding the right startup/seed deals for 
their portfolio. They also help VC funds keep the 7 to 10 percent of startup/seed investment level 
in their deal flow. 
The framework discovered in this research shows the factors that make up the EIR 
program and their effects on cost. Practitioners can use this framework to start or polish their 
own EIR programs. Governments and academicians can use it to improve the field of equity gap 
research. 
 
Challenges and Future Research 
The research used to develop this model draws on qualitative data collected in Israel 
and on USA-based literature studies. It would be appropriate to test this VC approach (using 
EIR programs) to closing the equity gap in countries other than Israel. Fundraising, investment 
in buyouts and later stage investments take place in an extremely well-developed, globalised 
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market. In contrast, when investing in startup/seed ventures (ECD-USDoC, 2005), there is a 
home bias in the activities of venture capital funds. 
Another limitation was the small sample size: Too few entrepreneurs and angel investors 
were interviewed because of the narrow research question. Enlarging the research question to 
include inquiry into the price that entrepreneurs pay with the EIR program and what is happening 
to the angel investors in Israel may prove useful. Do EIR programs in Israel play the same role as 
angel investors in Silicon Valley? Are there fewer angel investors in Israel? Perhaps differences 
between cultures would explain why the equity gap is more dominant in some countries than in 
others. As an example, as demonstrated in Table 1, Israeli VCs differ from their American 
colleagues in their enthusiasm toward early stage/startup ventures in the ICT market.   
Quantitative research is also recommended to compare results in different countries and 
cultures. Another area of interesting quantitative research would be to separate the effects of 
syndication and government incentives from the EIR program. 
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APPENDIX A 
Interview Script 
 
Interview Script 
Summer, 2005 
 
Research Topic:  Pre-Seed Stage Investment of Venture Capital Funds (in Israel): Entrepreneurs 
in Residency (EIR) Programs 
 
Interview Introduction and Open-ended question. 
Three types of questionnaires will be used: 
 VC fund partners 
 EIR entrepreneurs 
 Other entrepreneurs 
 
INTRODUCTION to all interviews: 
 
 Thank you for receiving me and agreeing to be interviewed for my research (EDM 
Program at Case Western Reserve University) in Entrepreneurship. (Here I explain the 
program) 
  My study looks at VC funds that focus on initial stage and follow-on investments in 
seed stage projects (also angel/pre-seed projects). I am interviewing several VC fund 
partners and their early stage “entrepreneurs”. I would like to include also examples of “not 
successful” ventures 
 
SCRIPT: 
 
1. About the Venture Capital Firm  
a. Can you tell me about this VC partnership? 
b. How many partners?  
c. How big is your fund? 
d. History of the fund? 
e. What industries do you invest in?  
f. Which Industries have “been good” to you? 
g. How many exits? (IPOs and Company sales) 
h. How many seed investments have you done?  
i. If yes, which ones? 
j. Have you done any angel level (pre-seed) investments? 
k. If yes, which ones? 
l. Do you usually invest “after” angel investors? Compared to the past? 
 
2. Personal questions 
a. Have you: 
i. Served in IDF (Israel Defense Forces) 
ii. Computer Units; 
iii.  Combat Officer 
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b. How would you qualify your previous knowledge/experience 
i. For Technological Prior Knowledge (TPK) 
ii. Managerial Prior Knowledge (MPK) 
 
3. About the EIR program 
a. Tell me about your EIR program? 
b. When did it begin? 
c. What prompted it? 
d. Do you know some other EIR programs? 
e. Are they different? 
f. Do you think it has been successful? Why? 
g. If you were to start one over again, would you do it differently? 
h. What guidance would you give to a VC friend who was considering creating 
an EIR program? 
i. What guidance would you give to an entrepreneur friend who was considering 
joining an EIR program? 
 
4. (Open question for VC partner and entrepreneur). Could you tell me the 
background of the entrepreneur or VC partners in  
a. How would you define a HIGH STATUS entrepreneur? 
b. Do you consider him to have “HIGH STATUS”? if yes why? if no why? 
i. Served in IDF (Israel Defense Forces) 
ii. Computer Units 
iii. Combat Officer 
iv. Technological Prior Knowledge (TPK) 
v. Managerial Prior Knowledge (MPK) 
c. Grade his previous knowledge in each of the following areas:: 
i. Technology Knowledge 
ii. Network Development 
iii. Software Development 
iv. Hardware Development 
v. Educational Achievements 
vi.  Market Knowledge 
vii. Customers’ needs and  problems  
viii. Industry trends 
ix. Management Experience 
x. VC relations 
xi. Served in IDF (Israel Defense Forces) 
1. Computer Units 
2. Combat Officer  
 
5. About the EIR based venture 
a. Can you describe the venture? 
b. How much was invested at the beginning?  
c. Where ANGEL investors involved?  
i. If yes, did they help in any way? 
d. For VC partners only: 
i. How much of your time is/was spend on the venture’s issues weekly? 
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ii. Can you compare that with other ventures? 
e. For entrepreneurs only: 
i. How much of his time is/was spend on the venture’s issues weekly? 
ii. Can you compare that with other ventures you know/knew? 
f. How would you put a value, at the present time, on the “venture”? 
g. Value at next stage?  
h. Do you consider it a success? 
i. How would you measure it? 
j. The (perceptions of the) relationship (mostly non-financial involvement) 
between the both of you 
i. Do you trust him? (how do you define trust) 
ii. How much of the relationship was based on trust? 
iii. Sweat equity invested in venture by other people connected to the VC 
fund (board, customers, banks, other people in the management team 
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APPENDIX B 
Selected Quotes 
 
1. Investing in ICT startup/seed companies (plus syndication): 
–“the big successes in venture capital are from early stage investing… that's why we do 
now early stage investing, and we target, the highest returns, we are expected by our 
investors to bring the highest returns”- 
 
–“ The whole VC game, especially when you are trying to get the high returns, the 
homerun, the big hits, only has to do with exceptions, if you follow any rule you'll fail, 
because it's only about, the statistics… they are very much against it, so trying to create 
any rule is just  working against you”- 
 
–“we brought together with us another fund, because we feel that usually we would like to 
have more “deep pockets" in addition to us ….  we would like to support the company 
towards all its life span, we negotiated with them basically the evaluation of the company 
and how much will go to the rest in the syndicate”- 
 
–“ they came here with a napkin, and they've sat with us and they explained us what they 
want to do….  we sat together with them and we wrote, we assisted them to write a working 
plan. We saw that the system basically would not be viable and we changed their idea. 
Design components for systems of others, and the company is today a 20 million dollar a 
year company.”- 
 
2. VC expertise: 
 
” We felt that we really have to fold our sleeves and work with the entrepreneurs, and 
really not manage them on a day-to-day basis  but be there and fulfill all their need., not 
necessarily just to increase sales and reduce expenses ( we joke about some VCs that 
when they sit in a Board that's basically what they always say, and they eat good Pizza) 
all our VC partners came with a tremendous amount of experience and we work with all 
our companies… we have today about 16 startup/seed  companies that we invested”- 
 
–“We are originating ideas all the time from the incubator group (basically from my 
partner, myself and other people who work here in the group of companies in our 
portfolio)  and may tell us about an idea that they need or they feel is needed…… then we 
bring in entrepreneurs… we also  bring in management to start a company, and we invest 
in the company ourselves…..  we take it forward ….., so we are very much involved in the 
beginning of the company, as the company grows we become less and less involved … we 
are still very active directors, even when the companies become public… we only invest 
in ICT, which is an area that we know and this is where we can trust our mind in 
generating new ideas that are sound….  we bring in VCs or other strategic investors 
along the way, we may or may not invest with them …. normally we invest only 
startup/seed stage money….., if we feel the company is worthwhile we keep on investing 
and help the other investors feel more secure…  then we take the company public “- 
 
–“We know how to help an entrepreneur build companies, we know how to help them 
recruit, we know how to help them figure out product marketing, market positioning, his 
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strengths, his weaknesses and the competitive roadmap. We are active investors. It 
doesn't mean that we are management but we are active investors. Our strength is 
understanding the startup/seed ventures in the ICT industry. Later stage investment… it's 
a different skill set it’s much more financial rather then industry specific”-  
 
3. VC’s deal flow and EIR investments: 
 
–“to manage a large amount of money is a burden also, you need to find a lot of projects 
and that puts you in pressure”- 
 
–“We created a company with the EIR because in order for him to get investments we 
have to create a company, we don’t invest in people, we don't put money in the account of 
somebody "go ahead and do it!", it has to be totally transparent and controllable”- 
 
–“If VCs have to invest a half million or a million dollars it's not interesting for them… 
they need to invest several millions in its life span ….. they need to have returns of five 
…, seven …, ten …. on the money because that's the role of venture capital”- 
 
–“We don’t invest in ideas, we don’t invest in people, we don’t invest in companies, we 
don’t invest in concepts, we invest in DEALS”- 
 
4. Repeat entrepreneurs and failure: 
 
-“ because entrepreneur is something that you should have in your blood, something 
in the DNA, it's not something that you can learn….”-, 
 
–“I don’t know if your chances of succeeding the second time are better than the first 
time or not, in some cases at least one company like this, the person has been tainted by 
the bubble, it was too easy the first time, so he started a company, did very well, had a 
nice exit but really didn't have to build anything, so you know, you make an assumption 
that that's how you do it, and it's not the case, you either have to build a real 
organization and have a plan that makes money and so on, it's not just developing the 
technology and getting it sold for half a billion – it doesn't work anymore”- 
 
–“when you see an entrepreneur that you think is a good entrepreneur, a serial 
entrepreneur, someone that already had previous experience, a startup, it doesn't mean 
that he has been successful in the previous one, of course  not, probably the startup hasn't 
done well but he is a good guy, … and you are convinced that he can do it again and 
learned from his mistakes”- 
 
-“ entrepreneur is someone that first of all understands how to go to the market, what 
to ask, how to make the business plan, and how to make validation of an idea, and how to 
raise money, of course you can not predict entrepreneurship in someone, without 
previous experience”- 
 
5. EIR programs and defining success as funding their ventures: 
 
–“ nearly every one (VC funds) now has an  EIR”- 
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–“ Entrepreneur in residence is someone who is trying to build a company, is looking for 
an idea to become sort of an entrepreneur to take the idea from very early stage. 
Executive in residence is someone who was an executive in a company and he is mainly 
looking for a CEO position in a company that we will help him find together, and a 
venture partner is somebody who has his own activities and is affiliated with us, looking 
with us at opportunities, adding domain expertise, not necessary as a CEO or as a sort of 
an entrepreneur, but he might be  personally  investing or joining the board”- 
 
–“ I think, in the four and a half years since we started we looked at close to 1,500 
companies and we invested in 24… investing in 2 out of 5 EIRs…. success is investing 
versus those we ended up not investing…. that's part of the program, it just shows that we 
take it seriously and we do look at it objectively…. so two out of five is still a much higher 
percentage of our normal investing percentage, our normal investing percentage 
statistics are 24 out of 1,500,… ….EIR is  pretty successful if you are looking at how 
successful it is in generating  plans that we are interesting in investing in’- 
 
–“ EIRs?…. I would say we had 8, and 4 turned into companies, which is I think is a very 
high percentage. We pride ourselves of being, you know, the fund with the most EIR 
based invested companies”-. 
 
–“you really get three things: you get funding,  you get access to the venture capital 
partners in the firm, which are usually very strong people in technology and business and 
the third thing you get is access to the people who are linked to the venture capital firm  
(use their network and their people to actually help evaluate ideas once we came up with 
ideas)  that was very helpful.”- 
 
-“You learn not to look at the VCs as the other side…  the reality is that everyone is on 
the same side while checking the idea… obviously,  later once you start discussing 
business terms there are  two different sides …  each side wants to get a bigger piece of 
the pie’’-. 
 
–“ EIR is a very risky proposition. Basically the idea of EIR is that you are going in 
without having an idea of what you are going to do, and it means that you need lots of, 
ability to change your business model and evolve over  time..  first of all you need lots of 
flexibility in finding the idea, but then also you need lots of flexibility because you are 
going to change again many times before the first stages of the venture”- 
 
–“in a market that is very competitive, assuming that the market is competitive, and 
that's my assumption, it (EIR) gives you actually a first look…. if the EIR is coming 
after the end of the incubation with a very exciting idea, I buy myself an option to be 
an investor there, which otherwise probably I would not be able to…  I have the 
option to invest … it's not without price, there is a price…..not cheap, if you are doing 
a few EIRs and nothing happens in a year, … it's not cheap, it's also time consuming 
– you have to talk to them, to work with them”- 
 
–“ a strong EIR can bring a great network and help you find deals that you will not know 
about, that he knows about it just because of his position in the industry. There are a lot 
of benefits. It costs money, but there are a lot of benefits to it”-  
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–“ our Entrepreneur in Residence program is a little different than other funds, we have a 
"no strings attached" type of Entrepreneur in Residence program, it means that by hosting 
an entrepreneur here, and I am sure you already know, EIR is used both for Entrepreneur 
in Residence and Executive in Residence, we haven't done any of the latter yet; 
Entrepreneur in Residence we've done a few, as I said, it's "no strings attached" meaning 
that we host the entrepreneur here, we expect them to develop the plan that they have in 
mind when we bring them here, so we don’t bring them here when they don't have a plan in 
mind, but we expect them to develop that plan into something that can be decided on as an 
early stage investment within 4 to 6 months…… when and if they do, then we have them 
present to us just like any other person coming through the door, and we try to make an 
impartial or objective decision, just like we try to make with anyone else, whether to invest 
or not. We do not take a right of first refusal, so the entrepreneur can decide, after he 
comes up with his great idea, not to show it to us for investment, he can take it to someone 
else to invest, although we hosted him. We pay him a monthly salary, very specific expenses 
that are required for his research work, building up his business plan, travel, research 
material”- 
 
–“ EIR is a clever way for certain VC funds to hang on to good entrepreneurs and give 
them a home, or a part time home for a period of time. So I've seen, a couple of different 
models of EIRs, both in Israel and in the Silicon Valley. I've seen the model where a fund 
has worked with an entrepreneur in the past who have done two or three startups, they’ve 
been successful, they would somehow like to maintain a relationship with that entrepreneur 
because he's done a good job, the entrepreneur isn't ready to commit to anything yet, he 
wants to take a little bit of time off, breath a little bit, take a look around, see what his next 
thing is going to be – so the fund gives him an office, it gives him access to their deal flow 
in case he sees something that attracts him, the fund also can have him handy in case they 
need a replacement CEO for one of the portfolio companies, so it's a semi-formal 
relationship, because rarely can you say to that entrepreneur in residence "you can't work 
for any other startup"’- 
 
-“ it's a good justification of your management fee….  a lot of the larger funds, the 500--
800 million dollar funds, even at a 2% management fee, it's a very large operating budget. 
One of the ways to justify that operating budget is to have EIRs. There is a limit to how 
many partners you want to bring on,  it's interesting that some of the larger funds say that 
at some point it becomes very difficult to manage the partnership if they want to expand 
beyond a certain point, it's too difficult… what they do instead is they look for effective 
ways to use their management fees, and one of the effective ways is to have EIRs. The EIR 
will help you evaluate deal flow, the EIR may attract some good deal flow, because of 
where he's been, what he's done”- 
 
-“the high status EIR has a recognized name in Israel, did a superb job in his last position, 
it gives positive PR, brings in a lot of deal flow because a lot of entrepreneurs  met him 
before”- 
 
–“ EIR in  terms of advantages for the VC – first of all if it’s a person they know…...a lot of 
things are around the people, and I saw several startups that came here and the VC 
thought the idea was good, the people were not suitable and they let it go…..maybe they 
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can take the idea to other people, an idea and a person don’t have to go together, so if the 
team isn’t  good. They will not invest unless they can put there their own EIR…. a person 
who is good as an entrepreneur and can lead a company …… especially knows a 
particular market….. can do a lot with a good idea in this market……, he can make the 
idea happen”- 
 
6. EIR and VCs from same backgrounds especially the Israel Defence Forces: 
 
–“fixing the valuation in this stage (startup/seed), validation takes a lot of time, very 
consuming, tedious, you have to talk , to people like you…”- 
 
–“where you were in the army will influence my decision, those are filters that filter 
certain types of people. It's always when you have someone who came from a certain 
background that he went through certain things and did successful things,. it adds 
points”- 
-“ my impression was that  the VC  is going to be a great partner. So it was first of all 
that I wanted to work with the specific VC and also I was impressed by the partner and 
wanted to work with him personally…”- 
 
–“ You make deals only with very high status entrepreneurs, as an anecdote let me tell 
you, I told my wife that an entrepreneur was a fantastically credible person, hard 
working, smart and also handsome, so she asked me why I married her and not him… I 
have an ongoing argument with my wife whether or not to do business with friends. She 
says it is not worth fighting over. I say yes, with whom should I do business with, if not 
with friends?”- 
 
-“There are some VCs who are really not part of the "old boys" network.. Entrepreneurs 
have a  very different expectations from US based VC  versus an Israeli one. He knows, 
that if he needs to hire some super duper software guy, young guy out of the intelligence 
corps – I am not going to help him with that. If he needs to get into a US company I can 
do it. What I've seen over the years is that Israelis have a better understanding today that 
a great product is a great product, but it doesn't get sold alone, if they want the contacts 
with the foreign vendors they need US based VCs”- 
 
-“people need to have the experience of working together, know how they think, how they 
work, and there is a very high value to the fact that me and the VC partner, although we 
sit in different companies, we know how each other thinks, he is a board member, I am an 
executive, but I know where his good and strong sides are, and he knows where I need 
some assistance, even before I ask, and vice versa”- 
 
7. Entrepreneurial team: 
 
–“ the chemistry between the entrepreneurial team (among themselves) and with  the VC  
has to be good …. but most companies fail, I think, because of inter-personal problems, 
it's not because of technology. You know, things don't go very well and things almost 
always don’t go well at some point and then people start to blame each other and point 
fingers”- 
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8. Conflict of interest between VCs and Entrepreneurs: 
 
–“Some endeavors are great businesses, but do not make good investment for a VC. A 
good example, a very small market, you can make millions of dollars but it won't be a big 
market for a VC. Maybe the business just requires significant marketing investment; it 
can still be a good market but is also not a good thing for VCs. So basically by choosing 
EIR program you are limited to ideas that make sense for a VC.”- 
 
-“ it happened to me several times in the process, we actually came up with ideas that 
were really good ideas and you can make very nice companies around those ideas, but 
were not a good fit for the VC and I had to abandon them. That's part of what you're 
taking on yourself when you are going with EIR.”- 
 
-“the due diligence was like nothing happened before, they just started from zero…. as 
the CEO or as the founder of the company, you don't really want to get any discounts in 
checking your ideas…  the only thing that will happen is harm to both sides … as the 
founder you want to make sure that you're spending your time on something that makes 
sense and can make money, and as VCs they want to make their money work on 
something that make sense and then will make more money”-. 
 
–“ differences in interest between entrepreneur and the venture capital fund itself are 
many. Because, a company that can be interesting to me may not be interesting for them! 
…. company that can make millions and can be sold for 20-30 million dollars … it's good 
for me, especially if I have interesting equity there, but for the venture capital fund it's 
not interesting”- 
 
9. Trust and trusting: 
 
–“ The VC partner understands where this track that I am using may take me…, he knows 
that if there are changes in the plans I will always speak with him early and consult with 
him, so basically he is not surprised by bad news, or by strange activities or things that 
could surprise him , because we've created some relations where his advice  is useful.”- 
 
-“ so we are getting into this process of working together, I like his ideas, his ideas fit 
my own way of doing business and they are also good”- 
 
–“what is this trust? I don't know how to express it, because I sort of want to say very 
radical things. You trust such people (entrepreneurs) one hundred percent, one thousand 
percent, day and night. And almost every technological thing he says he will do, you trust 
him to do, plus minus the schedule, with perfect quality. I am pretty sure they hear 
similar things from me regarding agreements…… what to do with the commercial aspect, 
what to do with the bank. They also follow me blindly. I mean it is not an issue at all. No 
issue”- 
 
–“I believe that eventually only someone who invests 150% of himself and more in the 
company might become essential. I have bad experience with advices of part-timers; I 
don't find this to be useful.”- 
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–“ we (VC partners and EIR) have a weekly 3 hour meeting, brainstorming on ideas and 
on companies, so I got my own ideas do some presentation and they give me 
feedback…… they said: "listen this week we are meeting with this company, we met this 
that company, does it interest you?" and we discuss the business mode of the company 
and sometimes we schedule other meeting during the week to see that company etc…… 
they also help me with validation, if I need to contact some … like vendors,, companies 
like Samsung or …… I needed to ask questions and to validate – they help me with their 
connection and it was very useful, very helpful. When you are outside of a VC and you 
think of idea, it's difficult, you know, you have to use your own connections and start, but 
here, when you are coming from within, you know, the money community, it's quite easy 
to get you any meeting you want, and it's like you are doing it in, you know, in a luxury 
environment, and that's really good”- 
 
10. Government incentives: 
 
–“…in '85 we actually started, at that time we have done mainly what you call "corporate 
advisory assignments", "privatization", "advisory services" to the government, "company 
evaluation", and we tried all the time to raise money to a venture capital but it was 
useless until 1992, when the market in Israel got an inflection with the initiative of the 
government called "Yozma", which is in Hebrew "initiative" – it was a special program 
to leverage the funds, or equity funds that have been brought by investors, this was the 
first wave of VC funds in Israel, and since then we are engaged in venture capital funds, 
and we have actually spun all our other business and we are focusing today only on 
venture capital funds”- 
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